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BEVIS LONGSTRETH*
Statistics evidence the increasing internationalization of the capital
markets. By every measure, one sees the ascendancy of a global view of
capital markets and their use in capital formation. This view is shared
by both the suppliers and users of capital and the financial in-
termediaries who serve them. One important implication of the global
view is a growing substitutability among the world's major securities
markets, leading to increased competition among regulators of those
markets to hold and increase the securities business transacted within
their jurisdictions.
United States equity markets are losing ground to foreign ones as
deregulation outside the United States proceeds apace. The Securities
Industry Association reports that, during the past twelve years, the
United States has seen its share of the world equity markets shrink
from over sixty-one percent to just over thirty percent. The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) reports that, as a percentage of total
registrations in the United States, foreign issues have decreased from
thirteen percent in 1977 to three percent in 1986. Recently, at least
fourteen companies in the United States have chosen the London mar-
ket to float their initial public offerings, subsequently registering their
issues on the London Stock Exchange's unlisted securities market. The
reason assigned for choosing this surprising venue for capital raising
was lower costs. At the end of 1986, only fifty-nine foreign companies
were listed on the New York Stock Exchange (of which one-third were
Canadian), compared to 512 foreign listings on the London Stock
Exchange.
These statistics bespeak a problem for the SEC. For fifty years,
this agency has been relatively free of competition from other market-
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places and regulators. For the future, the SEC can expect these pres-
sures to increase dramatically. The root causes are (i) the demand of
U.S. investors for securities of foreign issuers, (ii) the demand of for-
eign issuers for cheap capital, (iii) the relatively high cost of raising
capital in the United States, and (iv) the growing ease with which in-
vestors and issuers can find one another outside the United States.
The important question, then, is whether, to what extent, and in
what ways the SEC will deregulate in response to competitive pressures
exerted by the globalization of capital markets and our country's stake
in preserving its dominant, or at least major, role in those markets.
Will a "competition among regulators" encourage the SEC to pare
away unnecessary rules by applying a more vigorous cost-benefit analy-
sis - one in which investor protection will be only one of several fac-
tors to be weighed? An affirmative answer is found in a number of
recent SEC actions, suggestive of broad policy direction as well as spe-
cific future steps.
Among these "straws in the wind" is Rule 3a12-8,1 permitting
futures trading in the United States. on unregistered foreign sovereign
debt. Although foreign sovereign debt itself must be registered to be
sold in the United States, futures now can be traded without registra-
tion of the underlying securities. Another "straw" is the SEC staff no-
action position permitting London Stock Exchange market-makers to
place their quotes on NASDAQ (and accept resulting orders in
London) without registering as broker-dealers in the United States.'
Others include the SEC staff consideration being given to a "free trad-
ing zone" in the United States for institutional trading in unregistered
securities, the two no-action letters granted last year to College Retire-
ment Equities Fund,8 confirming the staffs willingness to recognize the
legitimate (and growing) interests of U.S. institutional investors not to
be so "protected" by U.S. laws that they are disadvantaged as global
investors, and the Vickers da Costa no-action letter,4 permitting this
foreign broker-dealer and its foreign affiliates, without registering as
U.S. broker-dealers, to cover the U.S. Vickers subsidiary in its NAS-
DAQ market-making functions so as to assure that the U.S. subsidiary
1 17 C.F.R. 240.3a12-8 (1987).
2 National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, SEC No-Action Letter (May 7, 1986)
(LEXIS, FedSec Library, Noact file).
' College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (June 4, 1987)
(LEXIS, FedSec library, Noact File); College Retirement Equities Fund, SEC No-
Action Letter, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 78,420 (Feb. 18,
1987).





functions solely as riskless principal.
I see these actions as examples of a new balancing test that re-
sponds to the competitiveness of the worldwide marketplace and the
need for the SEC to accommodate its rules in the interest of keeping
U.S. investors on shore. For the SEC, the quandary has been whether
to protect U.S. investors somewhat by lessening the traditional rules, or
by sticking to those rules, to protect not at all, as U.S. investors go
offshore and U.S. markets erode against all foreign competition. These
"straws in the wind" signal - perhaps - a willingness by the SEC to
bend in pragmatic ways.
The U.S. federal securities laws started out as, and in the main
have continued to be,. a conservative regulatory approach to investor
protection, based on full disclosure. This approach stands in sharp con-
trast with the "merit" approach adopted by many of our states in their
blue sky laws but rejected by Congress in 1933 and 1934 when our
basic securities laws were written. Yet in a sense, the rigorous applica-
tion of the U.S. federal securities laws to foreign issuers whose securi-
ties trade or are offered in the United States has the effect of imposing
a U.S.-devised regulatory "merit" system on foreign issuers. (To cite
but one example, only the U.S. concept of "generally accepted auditing
standards" will suffice for offerings made here.) Advances in communi-
cations technology are rapidly making it as easy for investors and issu-
ers (both domestic and foreign) to avoid this U.S. merit system as it has
been for domestic investors and issuers to avoid state merit systems in
the past. (One startling statistic: since 1964 the real cost of recording,
transmitting and processing information has fallen by more than
ninety-five percent.)
I want to dwell for a moment on the obstacles our securities laws
present to foreign issuers seeking to tap U.S. sources of capital, and one
route around this obstacle. The statistics noted earlier confirm what
securities laws practitioners already knew. Our rigid and detailed rules
regarding disclosure, accounting principles and auditing standards, to-
gether with the statutory framework for assessing damages against of-
ficers and directors who are negligent, discourage foreign firms from
raising capital here.
In theory, at least, this network of rules has been found necessary
to protect U.S. investors. This public goal provides the statutory under-
pinning to the rules. It is doubtful, however, that a solid empirical case
in support of this proposition could be made. Nor does the SEC con-
sistently impose those rules on public distributions. Consider, for exam-
ple, the rules governing the public offering of investment company
shares, particularly those proposing to invest in the securities of foreign
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investors.
The U.S. investment company increasingly is being used as a vehi-
cle for U.S. investors to acquire the securities of foreign issuers unwill-
ing to incur the burdens of registration here. Today there are more
than eighty U.S. investment companies specializing in foreign securi-
ties, with assets of more than $24 billion. The dichotomy between the
extensive information required of a foreign issuer seeking to access U.S.
investors directly by registering under the Securities Act, and the
skimpy data routinely permitted by the SEC for investment companies
seeking to assemble a pool of capital for investment in foreign issuers
outside the United States, is nothing less than breathtaking. The Tem-
pleton Global Income Fund, a closed-end fund underwritten by Merrill
Lynch, raised $1.1 billion on a prospectus that revealed nothing about
the Templeton record of performance in managing money (which is
very good, I am told) and was so all-encompassing in its description of
the types of securities to be purchased (for example, among corporates',
they could be domestic or foreign, rated from AAA to CC or unrated if
of "comparable quality") as to be essentially a "blind pool."5
Of course, once the investment company is funded, it can invest in
foreign issuers outside our shores, thus enabling those issuers to access
U.S. capital without conforming to our rules. One can reasonably ques-
tion the logic and coherence of our securities laws when such drastically
different rules apply to these two routes by which foreign issuers can
reach U.S. investors. I would not try to defend what strikes me, in
important respects, as inadequate disclosure requirements for the new
global form of blind pool, of which the Templeton Fund is but one
among many examples. But I do believe our rules impose unnecessary
burdens on foreign issuers that cannot reasonably be justified as neces-
sary to investor protection.
The ease with which not only capital, but business and labor too,
can move across borders was noted last fall in regard to taxation by the
economist Herbert Stein in an op-ed piece for The Wall Street Jour-
nal.' Mr. Stein suggests that resource mobility will foster international
tax competition, tending to limit the tax rates that nations can impose,
with corresponding constraints on expenditures. Since, in the case of
At the height of the South Sea Bubble, in the early eighteenth century, public
funds were raised by a company whose purpose, as described in its "prospectus," was
"for carrying on an undertaking of great importance, but nobody to know what it is."
L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SEcURITIES REGULATION 2 (2d ed. 1988). By describing
Templeton's fund as a blind pool, I do not mean to suggest it reaches the towering level
of obscurity achieved by this eighteenth century English company, but it could well
trace its ancestry to this source.




capital markets as in taxation, the challenge is to lower the governmen-
tal cost of transacting business consistent with the public interest, Mr.
Stein's point serves as a useful analog, helpful in appreciating some of
the implications of the vastly more competitive environment in which
our capital markets will operate in the future.
The pressures to lower transaction costs by moving transactions
offshore are increasing. Glass-Steagall' prohibitions against bank un-
derwriting and dealing in corporate securities in the United States have
significant anti-competitive effects, increasing the cost of capital raised
in the United States compared to the Euromarkets. This is true because
securitization has become the most cost-effective method of financing
for most U.S. corporations, but domestic banks cannot compete with
investment banks in the United States because the distribution of secur-
ities is involved. Banks, however, can compete abroad. Glass-Steagall,
therefore, will increasingly be a force tending to erode United States
dominance in capital markets.
In international markets, securitized lending accounted for more
than eighty percent of the gross new credit arranged in 1986 compared
with about fifty percent in the mid-1970s. Increasingly, banks are tak-
ing their corporate clients offshore where they can compete through un-
derwriting and dealing, as well as traditional bank lending, beyond the
reach of Glass-Steagall. Deregulatory efforts by foreign jurisdictions
will aid and abet these challenges to United States dominance.
Removing the growing burden of Glass-Steagall is not within the
SEC's charter. But many other costly aspects of our capital markets lie
squarely within that agency's responsibility. To respond effectively to
the international competition, the SEC must be willing to disenthrall
itself from past successes. It will have to challenge the continuing utility
of the various securities laws in their present forms. It may have to
abandon certain types of regulation previously viewed as essential. For
example, in areas dominated by professionals on all sides of a transac-
tion, the antifraud rules, backed up by law enforcement, should suffice.
These professionalized areas are large, having grown exponentially
since the 1930s, when there were few pension funds or mutual funds.
Today the top 300 institutional money managers handle about $2 tril-
lion in pooled investment funds - a sum equal to about three-quarters
of the total assets of our 14,000 commercial banks. Competitive pres-
sures from non-U.S. capital markets are likely to hasten the day when
this sort of approach becomes a reality, initially for foreign issuers, but
ultimately for domestic issuers as well.
7 Federal Reserve Act, § 34, 12 U.S.C. §§ 347(b)-374(c), 412 (1982).
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Empirical data drawn from the international bond markets illus-
trate the growing challenge of foreign markets to United States domi-
nance in capital formation.' Until the U.S. experiment with interest
equalization in 1964, the principal market for foreign bonds was the
United States. The exchange controls and capital market restrictions
imposed by European and Japanese capital markets made them much
less accessible to foreign issuers. Triggered by the IET, the Eurobond
market began to grow in the mid-1960s and, aided by significant regu-
latory legislation around the globe, is now the dominant marketplace
for corporate debt, whether denominated in dollars, yen, deutsche
marks, or sterling.
The United States has been the world leader in favoring competi-
tion over capital market controls, and this has proved a major factor in
making our markets attractive to foreigners. However, the United
States has also been the world leader in fashioning elaborate and, for
the issuer, burdensome rules for the protection of investors; these rules
have deterred foreign issuers from coming to our shores, a reality that
becomes increasingly important as other countries follow our lead by
dropping capital market controls in favor of competition. The SEC's
detailed rules regarding disclosure, accounting principles and auditing
standards, when combined with our general litigious environment and
the specific threat of statutory liability for officers and directors if mis-
takes are made, add up to a large dose of deterrence.
Recent statistics support these conclusions. Between 1981 and
1986, the Eurobond market grew from $31.3 billion to $187.7 billion,
or 600%, and the dollar denominated portion of that market grew from
$25.8 billion to $118.1 billion, or 457%. Over the same period, the
public market for foreign bonds in the United States was essentially flat
at $6.9 billion in 1981 and $6.8 billion in 1986. These numbers suggest
an aversion to the U.S. marketplace in comparison to the much less
regulated Eurobond market. That the tough regulations affecting pub-
licly offered and traded bonds in the United States are a significant
factor in this matter is suggested by another statistic. Over this same
period, 1981 to 1986, foreign bonds sold in the United States by private
placement increased from $2.0 billion to $10.9 billion, or 545%.
Although a privately placed security enjoys less liquidity than one
publicly sold through a registered offering, it avoids the considerable
burdens of registration. It seems reasonable to assume that this factor
8 1 am indebted to Terry Chuppe, Associate Director, Hugh R. Haworth, Chief
of Disclosure Policy Analysis, and Marvin G. Watkins, Financial Economist, Office of
Economic Analysis, Securities and Exchange Commission, for sharing with me the sta-




largely accounts for the stunning growth in the private market for for-
eign bonds over a period (1981-86) when the public market for foreign
bonds was flat.
In urging an evaluation of this data with regard to the need for
further deregulation of our capital markets, I do not devalue the impor-
tance of our rules in protecting investors and in fostering a sense of
confidence among investors that they are being protected - i.e., that
the game is fair. But the numbers suggest that investors themselves,
most of whom in these markets are highly sophisticated, are increas-
ingly willing to meet issuers in regulatory surroundings less protective
of their interests, and accordingly less burdensome and threatening to
the issuers, than our own public markets.
There is a domestic analog to the growing competitive pressures
from foreign market centers, useful in the way it reveals how accommo-
dating the SEC can be. Congressional support for small business grew
throughout the decade of the seventies, exerting pressure on the SEC to
tilt toward the interest of capital formation by small business by reduc-
ing the cost of raising capital, even if the result was a diminution in
investor protection. Congress, in effect, invited the SEC to use a balanc-
ing test in regulating to serve both of these competing national goals.9
Form S-1810 (adopted in 1979) and Regulation D11 (adopted in 1982)
were the principal results. Among other things, Regulation D permits
issuers to offer publicly up to $500,000 worth of securities to anyone
without being required to furnish specific information (although the
antifraud rules remain applicable). " In addition, offerings of up to $5
9 See generally Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
477, § 301, §§ 501-07, 94 Stat. 2275, 2291-94 (1980) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b), § 80c); Regulation D-- Revision of Certain Exemptions from Regis-
tration under the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and
Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(OCH) 83,106 (Mar. 8, 1982) (adopting Regulation D); Simplified Registration and
Reporting Requirements for Small Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6049 [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %82,046 (Apr. 3, 1979) (adopting Form S-
18); Simplified Registration and Reporting Requirements for Small Issuers, Proposed
Amendments to Forms, Schedules and Guides, Securities Act Release No. 5915, [1979
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 181,531 (Mar. 6, 1978) (proposing Form
S-18); Examination of the Effect of Rules and Regulations on the Ability of Small
Business to Raise Capital and the Impact on Small Business of Disclosure Require-
ments Under the Securities Acts, Securities Act Release No. 5914 [1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,530 (Mar. 6, 1978) (announcing hearings re-
garding effects of SEC rules on capital formation by small business).
10 Simplified Registration and Reporting Requirements for Small Issuers, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 6049 [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,046
(Apr. 3, 1979) (adopting Form S-18).
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-506 (1987).
1.2 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1987).
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million can be made to any number of "accredited investors" without
furnishing specific information."3 The definition of "accredited inves-
tor" includes individuals with substantial income or substantial net
worth,1 even though they lack sufficient knowledge and experience in
financial and business matters to be capable of evaluating the prospec-
tive investment. In 1986, some $60 billion of securities were issued
under Regulation D.
Whatever the merits of the deregulatory effort evidenced by Form
S-18 and Regulation D (a question that should certainly be taken up
with the empirical evidence of a long bull market and sudden crash
behind us), this experience illustrates a willingness on the part of the
SEC, when pushed, to accommodate its rules to a broader set of inter-
ests than it previously had been willing to recognize. As such it, too,
offers a promising "straw in the wind."
When I prepared these remarks for testimony before the House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance last
summer,15 the SEC had not transmitted its financial guarantee study to
Congress. That study, undertaken at the direction of Congress to ex-
amine the use of the Section 3(a)(2) exemption from registration under
the Securities Act for securities guaranteed by banks and the lack of
parallel exemption for securities similarly guaranteed by insurance pol-
icies, was delivered to Congress on August 31, 1987. Its reasoning and
recommendations could make one fearful that what seemed to be im-
portant "straws in the wind" pointing toward a more pragmatic regula-
tory approach may, in fact, be just random events. To explain what I
mean, a little background is necessary. Section 3(a)(2)"8 exempts from
registration not only securities issued by a bank, as in a case of a letter
of credit (LC), which increasingly has been used by corporate borrow-
ers to lower their- cost of money. Both the LC and the underlying secur-
ity it enhances are subject to the antifraud provisions of both the Secur-
ities Act (Section 17)1 and the Securities Exchange Act (Rule lOb-5).1
Although Section 3(a)(8) 9 of the Securities Act exempts insurance
1 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1987).
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) - .501(a)(7) (1987).
15 Internationalization of the Securities Markets - Today, Tomorrow and Be-
yond, Written Statement of Bevis Longstreth Submitted to the Subcomm. on Telecom-
munications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce at the Hearing on the Regulatory Implications of the Emerging Global
Securities Market, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987) (statement of Bevis Longstreth on Au-
gust 5, 1987).
Is 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)(1982).
17 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982).
Is 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987).




policies from registration, there is no exemption for the securities guar-
anteed by those policies. This difference, the SEC found, creates "an
apparent competitive advantage for banks" over insurance companies,
since a bank LC and an insurance policy are alternative forms of finan-
cial guarantee that compete wherever such credit enhancements are
needed. Insurance policies enjoy one possibly significant advantage over
bank LCs under both securities laws: they are not considered to be
"securities" at all, and thus are not subject to the antifraud rules. But
no finding of possible competitive advantage for insurance companies is
made on this account. The SEC's recommendation to Congress, based
on its finding of "apparent competitive advantages for banks in provid-
ing financial guarantees," is to amend Section 3(a)(2) to remove the
exemption for securities guaranteed by a bank, as in the bank LC.
What is puzzling about this recommendation is:
(1) the lack of any significant finding in the study supporting the
need for registration of the guaranteed security to protect investors or
otherwise serve the public interest;
(2) the rejection, as not determinative, of evidence adduced by
commentators that investors have never suffered a loss on bank guaran-
teed securities distributed to the public;
(3) the SEC's recommendation that registration of the issuer's se-
curities - a costly and, to the marketplace, unnecessary step - be
required, despite the study's findings that the rating agencies (a) play
the key role in the marketing of guaranteed securities, (b) have been
"quite reliable" in assigning the highest rating category, and (c) base
their ratings on the credit strength of the supporting institution
(whether bank or insurance company), without examining the credit-
worthiness of the issuer at all. (The SEC would preserve the exemption
from registration for the supporting institution's instrument (whether
LC or insurance policy), concerning which the marketplace attaches the
highest importance);
(4) the failure to examine the Congressional purposes behind the
Section 3(a)(2) exemption (except cursorily in a footnote) or the long
operational experience with the exemption since 1933 in terms of costs
and benefits to the investing public and issuers; and
(5) overall, the implicit assumption of the study that the burden of
proof in deciding how to address an apparent competitive inequality
derived from unequal regulation rests with those who would achieve
equality by removing regulation from the more burdened rather than
with those who would add regulation to the less burdened.
Congress should look carefully at this matter before following the
SEC's advice. Despite the study's abundance of valuable data, it does
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not answer the specific questions the SEC was directed to analyze in
Section 10520 of the Government Securities Act of 1986; instead, the
study appears to assume that registration under the Securities Act is
always a net benefit for investors.
This study and its conclusions were not affected by the competitive
pressures of internationalization or any special interest of Congress. In-
deed, this point may explain why, despite the discouraging message of
the SEC's financial guarantee study, those "straws in the wind" earlier
mentioned are, in fact, real signals of future directions wherever com-
petitive pressures from non-U.S. markets are felt.
This paper was written before the mid-October 1987 crash. De-
spite the push for new forms of regulation that are emerging out of the
various studies of the crash, the thesis of this paper need not be altered.
Indeed, the points need to be pressed even more forcefully, lest they get
lost in a wave of regulatory fervor, seeking to punish or remove the
villains responsible for the market's sudden descent.
No villain caused Black Monday. The marketplace was a victim of
its own successes. Advances in order execution, communication, product
and service development and computer capacity and speed have all con-
tributed to make today's marketplace vastly better for investors. Im-
provements include, in particular, (a) the near-instant delivery to sub-
stantially all investors of substantially all information material to
investment choice and (b) the opportunity for investors to act upon that
information almost instantaneously. Futures and options on securities
indices are two examples of new products that facilitate the rapid exe-
cution of investment decisions at low cost. Families of mutual funds
that permit swift transfers from equity to debt or debt to equity are
another example.
These important benefits to investors necessarily have adverse side
effects, including, most importantly, the potential for greater market
volatility, as the events surrounding Black Monday illustrate. The
broad conceptual question that needs to be addressed - with delibera-
tive care - is whether, to what extent and in what particular ways, if
any, the adverse side effects of these changes are sufficiently deleterious
to warrant governmental intervention, taking into account the costs that
such intervention will impose. This agenda, whatever the outcome,
ought not to impede the kind of study argued for here: a careful review
20 Government Securities Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-571, § 105, 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 3208.
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of the SEC's role in a global, competitive and multimarket setting,
looking to balance investor protection interests with the national goal of
maintaining our nation's preeminence as a capital market center.
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